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Under a discretionary regime the monetaryauthority makes no commitments
about future money and prices. Then, ifsurprise inflation conveys economic
benef its and if people form expectationsrationally, it turns out that the
equilibrium involves high and variablemonetary growth and inflation. Moreover,
since the high rate of inflation isanticipated there are no benefits from
inflation surprises. The implementation ofan enforced rule can lower the mean
rate of inflation while delivering thesame average amount of inflation
surprises, namely zero. Using these results as a background, thepaper dis
cusses alternative monetary rules, including quantityversus price rules and a
prescription for stablilizing nominal GNP. This discussiontouches on the
distinction between positive and normativeeconomics, which leads to a pessi—




Rochester, NY14627General Features of Rules and Discretion
The traditional debate over rules versus discretion focused on the capa-
bility and objectives of the policymaker. Advocates of rules referred to
imperfect knowledge about the economy and to policymakers' propensities to
further inappropriate ends, possibly motivated by special interests.' But, if
the policymaker were intelligent and well—meaning, then there was no obivous
defense for a rule that tied his hands in advance. Discretion seemed to be
synonoinous with flexibility, which one had no reason to deny to a smart, bene-
volent policymaker.
This perspective on rules versus discretion was changed by Kydland and
Prescott (1977), who looked at rules as a form of commitment. A commitment
amounts to a binding contract, which specifies in advance the actions that
someone will take, possibly contingent on a variety of exogenous circumstances.
In contrast, under discretion, a person promises only to take those future
actions that will best further his objectives later on. (Such promises are easy
to enforce!) Thus, discretion is the special case of a rule or contract in which
none of today's provisions restrict a persons's future actions. In the area of
private business dealings, we tend to think about optimal forms of contracts, and
would regard pure discretion as unusual. Similarily, in the context of public
policy, the perspective becomes the optimal form of rules or prior restrictions---
even the smart, benevolent policyniaker is likely to desire and use an ability
to make binding promises.
Kydland and Prescott discuss various areas of public policy in which commit-
ments are important. One example is patents, which encourage inventions, but
which also restrict the supply of goods ex post. Under pure discretion, a
policyinaker who has no past commitments and who cares about "social welfare"
would("onceand for all") invalidate all old patents, but continue to issue new2
ones. However, the perception of this form of policy by potential inventors has
adverse effects on newinventions,which soon become old inventions. Hence, the
optimal policy contains a mechanism to preclude or at least inhibit the abolition
of old patents. Then the details of the policy involve the standard tradeoff
between the incentive to invent and the ex post restriction of supply.
The manner of committing future actions varies with the area of public
policy. In some cases, such as the duration and scope of patents, the rules are
set out in formal law. Then the costs of changing laws (possibly coming under
the constitutional restrictions against ex post facto laws) enforces the govern-
ment's commitments. However, in the case of the Gold Standard Act, the existence
of a law proved in 1933 to be inadequate protection for those who held gold or
made contracts denominated in gold.2
More often a government's commitments rely on the force of reputation,
whereby people's expectations of future policy are tied in some fashion to past
behavior. For instance, if a government defaults on its debts, then potential
bondholders are deterred by the perception that future defaults are more likely.
Presumably, this consideration is the main deterrent to default by numerous
"sovereign" debtor countries today.(Sovereign must meanlackingin formal
collateral.)But, as a general matter, the precise connection between past
actions and expectations of future behavior is difficult to formalize in a model.
Monetary Policy under Discretion
A major contribution of Kydland and Prescott was the recognition that
monetary policy involves the same issues about commitments as do such areas as
patents, default on government debt, and imposition of levies on previously
accumulated capital (via changes in property taxes or in other taxes that fall oncapital). In the case of patents it is obvious that a policymaker must worry
about the link between current actions—-such as eliminating past patents or
changing the form of patent law—--and people's perceptions about the value of
presently issued patents (which motivate inventions). Similarly, the monetary
authority must consider the interplay between today's choices—-whether to
engineer a monetary expansion or to change the "law" governing monetary policy——
and people's beliefs about future money and prices.
Consider the example about the Phillips curve, as discussed in Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and in Barro and Gordon (1983a, b). These models involve the
following main ingredients. First, monetary policy works by affecting the
general price level. Second, unexpected increases in the price level (but not
expected changes in prices) expand real economic activity. Thus, there is an
"expectational Phillips Curve." Third, the "representative person," and hence
the benevolent policymaker, value these expansions of activity at least over some
range (which means that existing distortions make the "natural" level of output
too small). Fourth, inflation is itself a bad——people value it only as a device
to create unexpected inflation and thereby higher levels of economic activity.
This model is structually similar to the example about patents. At any
point in time the policymaker is motivated to generate unexpected inflation in
order to stimulate the economy. (The analogue is the expansion of supply via the
abolition of past patents.) But people understand these incentives in advance
and therefore form high expectations of inflation. Hence, the policymaker must
choose a high rate of inflation just to stay even——that is, in order for unex-
pected inflation to be zero. Finally, this high inflation imposes costs on the
economy. (The parallel is the decrease in inventions because of the expectation
3economy. (The parallel is the decrease in inventions because of the expectation
that current patents will not be honored later.)
Barro and Gordon (l983a, b) analyze the equilibria for monetary policy and
inflation for the Phillips—curve model. In the case of pure discretion, the
policymaker has no mechanisms for committing the future behavior of money and
prices, Rather, the policymaker has a free hand to maximize social welfare at
each point in time, while treating past events as givens. In this situation
there is an incentive in each period to create surprise inflation in order to
generate an economic boom. But individuals understand this motivation and
formulate their expectations accordingly. Thus, actual inflation cannot end up
being systematically higher or lower than expected inflation.
Overall, two conditions must be satisfied in equilibrithn. First, people's
expectations of inflation are correct on average (that is, expectations are
rational). Second, although the policyniaker retains the power in each period to
fool people via inflation surprises, he is not motivated to exercise this
power. In order for this second condition to hold, the policymaker's drive to
create unexpected inflation must, in equilibrium, be balanced by the cost of
inflation itself. In other words, inflation must be high enough so that the
marginal cost of inflation equals the marginal benefit from inflation surprises.
Only then will the chosen rates of inflation and monetary growth be consistent
with the policymaker's desire to maximize social welfare at each point in time.
The important point is that this equilibrium involves inflation that is high, but
not surprisingly high. Therefore, the economy bears the costs of high inflation,
but does not receive therewards that would arise from unexpected inflation.
The solution just described depends on the presence of benefits from
surpr:ise inflation, but does not rest on the existence of the (expectational)
4Phillips curve, pr Se. In particular, surprise inflation amounts to a capital
levy on assets, such as money and government bonds, that are denominated in
nominal terms. Hence, at a point in time, unexpected inflation works like a
lump—sum tax as a device to generate government revenue. Given that other taxes
are distorting, the policyinaker (and the representative person in the economoy)
would value the use of this lump—sum tax. Accordingly, the model parallels the
previous one with the Phillips curve, even though the source of benefit from
unexpected inflation is different. There is an analogous discretionary equilib-
rium with high inflation, but with no tendency for unexpected inflation to be
positive or negative.4
In the example of the Phillips curve, the incentive to create surprise
inflation hinges on the desire to expand economic activity. But this incentive
depends in turn on some distortions that make the natural rate of output too
low. The disincentive effects from income taxes and transfer programs are
possible sources of these distortions.5 Similarly, in t.he example where the
government values surprise inflation as a lump—sum tax, there must be an under-
lying environment in which alternative taxes are distorting. Thus, in both
cases, the existence of initial distortions underlies the prediction of high
inflation. Calvo (1978) discusses the general role of existing distortions in
these types of models. Notably, the bad outcomes under discretion depend on the
presence of these distortions.
Barro and Gordon (1983b) view the discretionary equilibrium as a positive
theory of monetary policy and inflation under present—day monetary arrangements.
Aside from predicting "high" average inflation and monetary growth, the model
indicates the reactions to changes in the benefits from unexpected inflation or
in the costs of actual inflation. For example, a rise in the natural rate of
5unemployment can raise the benefits from lowering unemployment through surprise
inf:lation, It follows that a secular rise in the natural unemployment rate will
lead to a secular rise in the mean rates of monetary growth and inflation.
Similar1y, the policymaker would particularly value reductions of unemployment
during recessions. The implication is that monetary growth will be counter—
cyclical, although such a policy can end up with no effect on the amplitude of
business cycles.
A higher stock of nominally—denominated public debt raises the benefits from
capital levies via surprise inflation. Thus, the model implies that more public
debt will lead to higher values of monetary growth, inflation and nominal
interest rates (although not to higher unexpected inflation). In other words,
the prediction is that deficits will be partly monetized. A similar analysis
suggests that indexation of the public debt for inflation——which removes some of
thebenefits from surprise inflation——will lead tolower rates of inflation and
monetarygrowth. Finally, a higher level of government spending tends to raise
the benefits from lumpsumtaxation (becausethe deadweight losses from other
taxeswould be higher). This change leads again to higher rates of inflation and
monetary growth. That is, the endogenous response of monetary growth implies
thatgovernment expendituresare inflationary.
Themodel assumes thatactual inflation is costly, but does not explain the
sourceof these costs. (Twofrequently mentioned possiblities are the adminis-
trativeexpenses for changing prices andthe transaction costs associated with
economizingon cash holdings.) In anycase,the positive analysis of monetary
policydoes imply that a downward shift in the costs of inflation will lead to
more inflation. Thus, if people think that inflation is not a serious problem,
then the economy will end up with a lot of inflation
6The analysis implies also that each flicker in the benefits from inflation
surprises or in the costs of inflation will be reflected in variations in infla—
tion. Hence, in contrast to an environment in which the government stabilizes
prices, there will be substantial random fluctuations of inflation and monetary
growth. Further, the variances of prices and money will be larger the greater
the random fluctuations in the variables that influence the benefits from
inflation shocks. For example, if there are frequent supply shocks (which alter
the natural rate of output), then inflation and monetary growth will be volatile.
Monetary Rules
The results under discretion contrast with those under rules——that is, under
regimes where the policymaker can and does make commitments about future monetary
growth and inflation. Under discretion, the equilibrium involved high inflation,
but no tendency toward surprisingly high inflation. Hence, the economy suffered
the costs from high inflation, but secured none of the benefits from inflation
surprises, Clearly, the policymaker can improve on this outcome by committing
himself exante to low inflation. If this commitment is credible——that is, if it
is adequately enforced——then people also anticipate low inflation. Therefore,
the equilibrium wou1d exhibit low and stable inflation,6 with the same average
amount of surprise inflation (zero) as before. These results support a form of
"constant—growth—rate rule," although applied to prices rather than to the
quantity of money,
Thereis a tension in this type of rules equilibrium because the policymaker
may retain the capacity to produce large social gains at any point in time by
"cheating"—that is, by generating surprisingly high iflation. Then there may be
a temporary economic boom or at least a substantial amount of government revenue
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obtained via a distortion—free tax. But, if such cheating were feasible and
desirabie then people would understand the situation beforehand. In this case
the low—inflation equilibrium would not be tenable. (Sometimes people say that
this equilibrium is "time inconsistent", although it is actually not an equilib-
rium at all.) Rather, there would be a high—inflation, discretionary equilib—
rium, as described earlier. That is why the enforcement power behind the
low—inflation rule is crucial. There must be a mechanism for binding the
policyniaker's hands in advance, so that (surprisingly) high inflation cannot be
chosen later, even if such an outcome looks good to everyone Note that
the rationale for t.his "binding of hands" applies even though (or actually
espec:i.aliy if ) the policymaker is well—meaning. This type of commitment is
necessaryinorder for low inflation to be credible and hence for the economy to
achieve the equilibrium with low inflation.
Although the low-infiation, rules equilibrium is superior to the high-infia-
tion, discretionary equilibrium, the rules equilibrium is still not "first
best,"The benefitsfrom inflation surprises——for example, from lower unemploy--
mentor from thegeneration of distortion—free government revenue——reflect some
external effects that. have not. been eliminated. In fact, it is the desire to
approach the first—best solution via inflation surprises that threatens
the viability of the low-inflation equilibrium. The pursuit of the first best
tends to push the economy away from the second best of a rule with low inflation,
andtoward the thirdbest of discretionary policy with high inflation. Again,
this perspective highlights the importance of the enforcement power that makesa
rulesustainable.
More generally, the optimal rule may set prices contingent on exogenous
events, rather than being non—contingent. For example, wartime can beaccompanied by high inflation, which constitutes surprisingly high inflation from
the standpoint of earlier times at which the war was not anticipated.In an
equilibrium, the counterpart must be surprisingly low inflation during peacetime.
This type of contingent rule may be desirable because it generates lots of
easy renenue via the capital levy from unexpected inflation during emergencies.
In particular, it is possible to hold down distortions from the income tax at the
most important times, such as wars.7 Although the necessary accompaniment isa
loss of revenue during the non—emergencies, the net effect of thiscontingent
policy is likely to be beneficial.8 Under the gold standard, governments did in
fact tend to go off gold during wars. This procedure enables a government to
pursue the type of contingent policy for inflation that I sketched above. In
this sense the movement off gold during wars was not necessarily a violation of
the "rules." However the subsequent return to gold at the previous paritywas
probably an important part of the enforcement process.
One difficulty with contigent rules is that they may be difficult to
verify.In particular, it is easy to confuse contingencies with the type of
cheating that I described earlier.9 Further, the policymaker would be inclined
to explain away high inflation as the consequence of some emergency, rather than
as a failure to conform with the rules. Hence, these considerations favor a rule
that is relatively simple, such as a constant—growth--rate rule for prices or
money, In any case the contingencies should be limited to well—defined events,
such as major wars. Although this limitation may miss some gains from contingent
action, the greater ease of enforcement makes it less likely that the situation
will degenerate into a high—inflation, discretionary equilibrium.
9ThePoykr's Reputation
Barro and Gordon (1983a) examine some possibilities for substituting the
policinaker's reputation for formal rules. In this setting people's expectations
of future inflation depend on past performance. Hence, unlike the caseofpure
discretion, the policymaker's choice of today's inflation rate assigns some
weight to the effect on future inflationary expectations. Such considerations
motivate the policymaker to hold downtherates of inflation andmonetarygrowth.
The example considered in Barro andGordon(l983a) involves a reputational
equilibrium in which the outcome for inflation is a weighted average of that
underdiscretionand that under a constant—growth—rate rule. Notably, the higher
the poi:icyinaker'sdiscountrate, the greater the weight attached to the discre-
tionary result, From a positive standpoint, the findings are qualitatively
in line with those under discretion. The main difference is that the reactions
of inflation to various shocks—-such as shifts in the natural rate of unemploy-
ment or in the size of government——are now smaller in magnitude, Hence, the
variances (as well as the means) of irf]ation andmonetarygrowth are smaller
thanthoseunder discretion.
One difficulty is the potential for multiple equilibria. There is a
bootstrap character to the reputational equilibria, whereby if people base future
beliefs on the policymaker's actions in some fashion, then the policymaker may be
motivated(ina range of cases) to validate these beliefs. Hence, various
equilibria conform with rational expectations as well as with period—by—period
optimization by the policymaker. Although one of the reputational equilibria
tendsto generatethe best results overall, it is unclear howtheeconomy
(perhapsguidedby the policymaker) would settle on this solution.
10A unique reputational equilibrium may obtain in cases where past performance
conveys information about the policymaker's own preferences (as in the model of
Backus and Driff iii (1984), who build on the work of Kreps and Wilson (1982)).
However, this analysis relies on differences in personal characteristics of
potential policymakers, which probably leaves little scope for systematic
theoretical analysis.
On the one hand, it seems that the equilibria supported by reputation are
uncertain approximations to the outcomes delivered by formal rules when supported
by appropriate enforcement mechanisms. But, on the other hand, it appears that
reputation, rather than a formal rule, prevails in many areas of public policy.
Possibly the costs of establishing and enforcing formal rules are often too great
to ignore.
ionetary Rules
In this section 1 assume that the choice is amoung types of monetary rules,
rather than between rules or no rules (that is, rules versus discretion). The
choices are often divided between quantity rules and price rules. In the former
category the policymaker aims for a target path of a monetary aggregate, such as
the monetary base, or Ml, or a still broader concept of money. Friedman's (1960,
Chapter 4) proposal for a constant—growth—rate rule for M2 falls into this
class. From October 1979 until late 1982, the Fed claimed to be following a
policy of this general type, which was framed in terms of monetary targets. But
it is hard to see from the data that the growth of monetary aggregates became
notably more stable, say from quarter to quarter. (On the other hand, interest
rates did show unprecedented volatility, which many people think related to the
Fed's new policy.)
11Under a price rule the monetary authority uses its direct instruments—-which
might be open—market operations, the discount rate, a pegged exchange rate, or a
set price of gold——In order to achieve a desired path for some target price. The
target might be a general index of prices, the prices of specified commodities,
an interest rate, or the exchange rate itself. Examples of price rules are the
gold standard, other commodity standards, a regime with a fixed exchange rate,
and Irving Fisher's (1920) "stable—money" proposal for varying the price of gold
in order to stabilize the overall cost of living. A policy of pegging a nominal
interest rate is also a price rule, but an incomplete one, Namely, this type of
rule requires some additional specifications in order to pin down the levels of
prices and other nominal variables (see, for example, Sargent and Wallace, 1975,
and MeCallum, 1984). Therfore, an interest—rate rule is not really a substitute
for a rule that specifies the quantity of some monetary aggregate or the level of
some price.
Generally, people are concerned with a variety of current and future prices,
rather thanwiththe quantities of monetary aggregates, Forexample,
people care about the mean and variance of inflation and nominal interest rates,
but not particularly about how much Ml is outstanding. Hence, the case for a
quantity rule must rely on ease of implementation and verification.'0 Even this
argument is compromised by the monetary authority's tendency to shift from one
target aggregate to another as it finds convenient on other grounds (see }Ietzel,
1984).Sucha regime involves feedback from unspecified ultimate targets
to money, rather than actually being a quantity (of money) rule.
Similarly, the reason for focusing on a narrow band of prices, such as gold
or an exchange rate, is that such regimes are relatively easy to operate and
monitor. Otherwise, it would be preferable to stabilize a broad index of prices,
12possibly using the price of gold (as in Fisher) or some other price instrument in
order to attain the desired behavior of prices in general.
At the risk of' engaging in normative economics (see below), I would advocate
a modified Fisherian regime in which open—market operations (rather than the
price of gold) were used in order to achieve a target path of a general price
index, such as the deflator for the GNP.'1 This type of regime involves a form
of feedback, whereby a price level above target triggers lower growth of the
monetary base, and vice versa for a price level below target. The objective
might involve a moving path of prices, which allows for nonzero inflation.
However, the ease of monitoring the system (and prevention of "once—and—for—all"
discretionary adjustments to the level of prices) argues for specifying the
target as a constant price level. This setup would also produce the most
convenient monetary unit——namely one that maintains a nearly constant purchasing
power.'2 However, the government's seigniorage is severely limited in this
context. Finally, it would be possible to permit deviations from the target
price level during major wars. This kind of provision parallels the tendency
under previous monetary regimes for governments to depart from gold in wartime.
A credible rule of this type works to stabilize prices even if there are
lags in observations of price indices or in the effects of (exogenous changes in)
money on the price level. In particular, if prices rise above target, then
people know that future monetary actions will bring prices back down to target.
This expectation of deflation raises the current real demand for money, which
lowers today's price level. In other words, there is a form of stabilizing
speculation that improves the functioning of the system. (The Swiss may have
been relatively successful in controlling inflation for these reasons and not
because of a constant—growth--rate rule for money——see Grossman, 1984).
13Overall, the proposed rule would generate a near zero mean inflation rate
andasmall forecast variance of future price levels. In such a regime the
prices of individual commodities would be accurate guides for the allocation of
resources. Hence, as in Hayek (1945), monetary policy provides for a stable
economic background that enhances the flow of information and thereby promotes
efficiency,
Recently some people have suggested that monetary policy aim at stabilizing
nominal GNP,ratherthan the general price level (see, for example, Hall, 1980,
andTaylor,1984). Since nominal GNPisthe product of real GNP andtheGNP
deflator,this rule prescribes inverse feedback of money to two things: first,
excesses of real GNPovertarget, andsecond, excesses of the deflator over
target. By contrast, the price—stabilization rule dictates feedback only to the
second item——given the price level, fluctuations in real GNPdonot induce any
reactionsofmonetary instruments,
In order to evaluate proposals for stabilizing nominal GNP, it is necessary
toask why feedbackfrom real GNPtomoney is desirable. In particular, this
reaction must meanthat themonetary authority does less good a job of stabi-
lizingthe overallprice level. That is, there are occasions when the policy-
makeraccepts greaterdepartures of the price level from target in order to
effectthe desiredresponse of money to fluctuations in output. But then there
musthe some gainfrom these monetary reactions to output that justifies the
accompanyingincreasein fluctuations of the general price level.
In manytheoriesassociated with the "newclassicalmacroeconomics," such as
Sargentand Wallace(1975), the regular reaction of money to real activity does
notsmooth outthe business cycle.13 Since people knowthatrecessions inspire
monetaryaccelerations,there are no systematic surprises, Then, if only the
14surprise movements in money matter for real variables, there would be no implica—
tions for the business cycle. It follows that it would be preferable to limit
monetary policy to the objective of stabilizing the general price level. Any
broadening of this objective threatens people's accurate perceptions of prices
(which has adverse real effects), but provides no offsetting benefits.
On the other hand, Keynesian theories with sticky prices suggest that
regular feedback from output to money can (usefully) smooth out fluctuations in
real economic activity. Hence, although it means an increase in the volatility
of prices, it is nevertheless worthwhile for money to react systematically to
variations in real GM?.
In effect, the proposal to stabilize nominal GM? is an attempt to unite
the principal warring factions of macroeconomists. The new classicists are
supposed to be happy because monetary policy is governed by a rule, and that rule
does entail stabilization of some nominal magnitude. Then the feedback response
of money to real GM? is to be regarded as a minor nuisance, most of which the
private sector can hopefully filter out.
Keynesians are supposed t.o be happy with the scheme because it allows for an
active response of money to recessions and booms. Presumably most Keynesians
would also accept the feedback from prices to money, although they many not opt
for the equal weighting attached to fluctuations in real GM? vesus fluctuations
in the general price level. Apparently, the main thing that Keynesians have to
give up is their "commitment" to discretionary monetary policy, which seems
little to ask.
The choice between the two objectives——stabilizing the general price level
versus stabliizing nominal GNP——corresponds to the weights one attaches to the
validity of the two competing viewpoints about macroeconomics. (Surely one of
15validity of the two competing viewpoints about macroeconomics. (Surely one of
these views must be correct!) Notably, if one attaches little weight to
Keynesiantheorieswith sticky prices, then the policymaker's preferred objective
would he stabilization of the general price level.
Ihave been vague in this paper about whether I am engaging in positive or
normative econoomics (which doubtless reflects my uncertainties, rather than a
desire to conceal truth). ln Barro and Gordon (1983a)we intended to carry out a
positive analysisof monetary policy, given that the existing institutions
dictated an environment of discretion. That is.,thepolicymaker could not opt
fora rule,under which there would be meaningful commitments about future money
andprices.Then, given these institutional constraints1 we analyzed the day—to--
day operating characteristics of the monetary authority. In particular, it did
not seem that the advice of economists would be especially relevant at this
level.
Gordon and I also contrasted the results under discretion with those
generated under rules——that is, under an alternative institution where the
policyinaker could and did make some cominitnients about future money and prices.
Inorderfor this comparison between discretion andrulesto be interesting, it
mustbe thatboth setups are feasible under some circumstances, That is, there
mustatsome level be a choice of whether (at a cost) to erect institutions that
do or do notpermitcommitments about future money andprices.But this choice
shouldbe as muchsubject to positive analysis asarethose about day-to—day
operations underagiven institutional mode. Further, if an economist labels the
actual institutional selection as inferior to the non—chosen option, then what
16does that labeling mean? Possibly the economist has unearthed new knowledge, but
other possibiities are more likely. Although Buchanan and Tu]lock (1962) and
Buchanan (1962) argue the opposite, it is unclear why the advice of economists is
more pertinent at the level of institutional choice than it is at the level of
day-to—day ope rat ions.
I suppose the answer is that economists' advice does have some role, but one
that is measured in the same way as the contribution of other factors of produc-
tion. Namely, economists' market wages——rather than claims to save the economy
billions of dollars through policy advice——tell us something about the group's
productivity. Although the wages of economists are fairly high, they still
represent a negligible proportion of the GNP.'4
1718
Footnotes
'See, for example, Friedman (1960, Chapter 4).
2For a discussion of the abrogation of gold clauses inpublicandprivate
contracts, see Yeager (1966, p. 305). Additional discussions are in Nussbaum
(1950,pp.283-91)andMcCulloch(1980).
3Theanalysiscanbeextended to incorporate the standard inflation taxor
otherrealeffects from anticipated inflation. Then the best rate of inflation
neednot be zero.
4SeeBarro(1983) for an elaboration of this model.
5These taxes andtransfersmay themselves be warranted as necessary counter-
parts of (valuable) government expenditures. Hence, there is no implication that
thegovernmentis failing to optimize on the fiscal side.
6More generally, one canchoosethe average inflation rate that is optimal
from the standpoint of the usual inflation tax,
7The government's abilityto rundeficitslessensthis incentive, but does
noteliminate it.Contingent on a bad draw, such as a war, it tendsto be
desirable totrigger the distortion—free capital levy.8Such an outcome obtains in the model of Lucas and Stokey (1983).They
consider a form of contingent public debt, which endsup paying off well during
peacetime and badly in wartime. If government bonds are nominally denominated
and non—contingent (for reasons thatescape me), the contingent behavior of
inflation achieves the same end.
9Fischer (1980) argues that governments may find it advantageous topreserve
some possibilities for cheating, rather than committing themselves fully not to
cheat (even if such commitments were feasible). One interpretationof Fischer is
that contingent rules are preferred to noncontingentones, as in the previous
example where governments inflate during wars or other nationalemergencies. A
second possible interpretation is that randomization of policymay sometimes be
useful. Randomized policies were non—optimal in the models ofmonetary policy
that I have considered (Barro and Gordon, 1983a), but Weiss (1976)offers an
example in which a randomized income tax would be desirable. However, Skinner
(1984) argues empirically that randomization of the income tax is, infact,
harmful on net.
101donot mean to argue that a constant—growth-rate rule formoney, if
implemented say 30 years ago, would have been inferior to actual monetary
policy. A quantity rule is likely to be better than discretion. Also, the
difference between a quantity rule, say for Ml, and a rule forstabilizing the
general level of prices derives from movements in the real demand for Ml. But
shifts in this demand—-especially the changes in velocity thatare induced by
shifting nominal interest rates—would probably have been mild if themonetary
authority had adhered for a long time to a constant—growth--rate rule.However,
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Qcont i nued
when starting from a state of high and volatile nominal interest rates, there are
serious problems in the implementation of a quantity rule. Namely, there is the
possibility of severe deflation during the transition to lower inflation, since
real cash balances must rise dramatically. The advantage of a price rule is that
it allows for large infusions of nominal money during the transition. Further,
since this monetary expansion arises only in response to the actual behavior of
prices, there is no threat to the credibility of the system.
11Simons (1936), who was concerned mostly with the superiority of rules over
authorities, also favored a price rule rather than a quantity rule.
12See Hall (1982) for a related discussion.
'3This conclusion also obtains in purely real theories of business cycles. In
other models monetary activism can affect the character of the business cycle,
but not in a desirable maimer. In these cases it follows inediately that
feedback from output to money should be avoided.
'4Perhap economists are like the water of the water—diamond paradox. If
there were only a few economists, then their overall wage income might be
enormous. But economists are in such abundant supply (being cheap to produce)
that their wage rate is driven down to a meagre level.References
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